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We examine the asymmetric effects of oil supply shocks, shocks to global real economic 
activity, and oil-specific demand shocks on the oil, non-oil and overall trade balances of a 
large sample of oil exporters and oil importers. Our empirical strategy accounts for 
endogenous oil prices, heterogeneous parameters, and error cross section dependence 
within a panel framework. We find that the pattern of asymmetries in the oil price-trade 
balance relationship depends on the source of the shock. For both oil exporters and oil 
importers, oil supply expansions are more important than oil supply disruptions; we 
discuss the role that Saudi Arabia plays in limiting the global effects of oil supply 
disruptions. Although increases in global demand deteriorate trade balances for oil 
importers and improve them for oil exporters, decreases in global demand have a similar, 
rather than an opposite effect. Our results corroborate the existing evidence that oil price 
increases only generate large global imbalances if they result from demand-side shocks; 
and we present new evidence that oil price decreases only benefit oil importers if they 
result from supply-side shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
Oil price shocks can have significant implications for macroeconomic performance because oil is 
necessary for most consumption and investment processes. Investigating the effects of oil shocks is 
particularly important given the recent fall in oil prices. This paper examines whether increases and 
decreases in oil supply and oil demand have asymmetric impacts on the oil, nonoil and overall trade 
balances of a large sample of oil exporting and oil importing countries. 
Many studies have examined the effects of oil prices on the macroeconomy1. When the oil price 
collapse of 1986 failed to produce an economic boom in oil importing countries, researchers began to 
examine the possibility that the effects of oil prices on output growth are asymmetric, in that oil price 
increases are more important than decreases2.  Apart from asymmetries, a new strand of the Oil Price 
Macroeconomy (OPM) literature has emphasized the importance of accounting for the sources of oil 
price shocks. This is because oil supply shocks and oil demand shocks have different implications for 
economic activity, and examining the impact of an average oil shock may be misleading (Kilian, 2009, 
Cashin et. al., 2014, Kilian and Murphy, 2014). In this paper, we argue that the response of external 
balances to asymmetric oil shocks differs for oil supply shocks and oil demand shocks. 
Large global current account imbalances over the past three decades have led to a growing literature 
that examines how oil prices affect trade balances and how oil revenues are recycled in the global 
economy (Rebucci and Spatafora, 2006). This oil price-trade balance literature often distinguishes 
between the oil, nonoil and overall balances (Kilian et al., 2009, Bodenstein et al., 2011, Le and Chang, 
2013, Allegret et al., 2015, Rafiq et al., 2016), and some studies also distinguish between the effects 
of oil supply and oil demand shocks (Kilian et al., 2009, Bodenstein et al., 2011, Allegret et al., 2015). 
However, asymmetric effects of oil prices on trade balances have received less attention. An exception 
is Rafiq et. al., (2016), who examine the differential effects of oil price increases and decreases on the 
trade balances of many countries, but do not distinguish between oil supply shocks and oil demand 
shocks. Their measure of an oil price change is, therefore, an average oil shock: an asymmetry in the 
effect of this shock may simply reflect differential impacts of supply and demand shocks on oil prices 
and trade balances.  
This paper contributes to the literature by incorporating the sources of oil shocks in examining 
asymmetric effects of oil prices on external balances. This distinction is important because insights 
from the asymmetric OPM literature can lead us to assume that supply and demand shocks which 
reduce the oil price would have lower impacts than corresponding shocks that increase it. This is not 
necessarily the case; indeed, oil price decreases resulting from supply expansions can have large 
effects on the global economy, even if oil price increases resulting from supply disruptions have muted 
effects (see for instance Fattouh and Sen 2015; Mohaddes and Raissi, 2019; Jarrett et al., 2019). Recent 
studies have found asymmetric effects of oil supply and demand shocks on investor sentiment (He 
and Zhou, 2018) and on stock returns (Zhu et. al., 2017). 
In this paper, we argue that there are valid reasons to expect asymmetries in the effects of oil supply 
and demand shocks on trade balances. First, an oil supply expansion can have a higher impact than a 
supply disruption; the latter can often be offset by counter-supply increases from other oil producers 
with adequate spare capacity. Second, a strong global economy can increase overall oil demand and 
deteriorate trade balances for oil importers, but the effects of weak global demand may depend on 
which countries are most affected. In particular, lower oil prices that result from a weak global 
economy can increase oil demand and deteriorate trade balances in oil importing countries where the 
economic downturn has little impact. Indeed, the emergence of China and India has diversified the 
global economy, so that economic recessions in developed countries is not necessarily associated with 
recessions in emerging markets. Third, to the extent that increases in oil-specific demand represent 
 
1 Kilian (2008, 2014) and Hamilton (2008, 2012) provide a review. 
2 Recent reviews of this literature can be found in Hamilton (2011) and Herrera et. al.,(2015) 
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precautionary oil demand driven by oil market uncertainty, a reduction in this demand merely 
represents oil market stability. This stability can itself increase spending on both oil and nonoil goods, 
deteriorating oil importers’ trade balance, rather than improving it. The arguments are analogous for 
oil exporters. 
We follow Kilian (2009) in decomposing oil shocks into three: oil supply shocks, oil demand shocks 
that reflect changes in global real economic activity i.e. aggregate demand shocks, and oil demand 
shocks that are specific to the oil market, such as precautionary or speculative oil demand. We then 
consider whether each of these shocks has asymmetric impacts on the oil, nonoil and overall balances 
of 25 oil exporters and 76 oil importers. We estimate three panel data models: Pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (POLS), the Mean Group model of Pesaran and Smith (1995) and the Augmented Mean Group 
(AMG) model of Eberhardt and Teal (2010) and Bond and Eberhardt (2013). Our empirical strategy 
accounts for the endogeneity of oil shocks to the global economy, for heterogeneous responses 
among countries, and for Cross Section Dependence (CSD). Moreover, we estimate the degree of CSD 
in our data using the exponent of CSD of Bailey et. al., (2016), allowing us better judgement among 
alternative methods.  
Our results show that the pattern of asymmetries depends on the source of the oil shock.  We find 
strong asymmetries in the effects of oil supply shocks and shocks to global real economic activity. 
Whereas oil supply disruptions have muted impacts on trade balances for both oil exporters and 
importers, oil supply expansions have large effects.  On the other hand, both increases and decreases 
in aggregate demand deteriorate trade balances for oil importers. Therefore, shocks that reduce the 
oil price have different impacts: oil supply expansions improve the oil balance for oil importers, but a 
fall in aggregate demand deteriorates it. These results enhance our understanding of asymmetric oil 
prices and have implications for policy: oil price increases only generate large imbalances if they result 
from demand-side shocks, and oil price declines only improve oil importers’ trade balances if they 
result from oil supply expansions. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the literature on oil 
prices and external balances. Section 3 uses evidence from the data and literature to discuss the 
rationale for asymmetric impacts of oil demand and supply shocks on external balances.  Section 4 
discusses the methods and data.  Section 5 presents the results and Section 6 provides some 
conclusions and policy recommendations. 
 
2. Oil prices and external balances 
Theoretically, Bodenstein et. al., (2011) build on the work of Backus and Crucini (2000) and examine 
the effects of oil prices on external balances using a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) 
model. The model makes a distinction between the oil trade balance, the nonoil trade balance and 
the overall trade balance.  When oil prices are high, the nonoil balance can facilitate the recycling of 
oil revenues from oil exporters to oil importers, helping to dampen overall trade imbalances. 
Bodenstein et. al., (2011) show that these effects depend on the source of the oil shock and the extent 
to which financial markets are incomplete: (i) oil supply shocks have lower impacts than oil demand 
shocks and technology shocks (ii) the higher the degree of market completeness, the lower the 
response of the nonoil balance. 
Empirical studies on the oil price-trade balance relationship are few. Kilian et. al., (2009) considers the 
effects of oil supply shocks, oil-specific demand shocks and aggregate demand shocks on external 
balances for many countries. They find that an oil supply disruption causes a small and temporary oil 
price increase; an increase in oil specific demand causes an immediate, large and persistent oil price 
increase; and an increase in aggregate demand causes a delayed but persistent oil price increase. 
Accordingly, they find that, for oil importers, oil supply disruptions have muted impacts, whereas both 
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oil specific demand shocks and shocks to global real economic activity cause large oil trade deficits. 
The three shocks, all associated with an oil price increase, lead to insignificant nonoil trade surpluses. 
The effects for oil exporters are generally analogous to those of oil importers. Le and Chang (2013) 
and Arouri et al. (2014) conduct country specific studies on the effects of oil prices on trade balances, 
but do not account for the source of oil price changes. 
The studies above do not consider potential asymmetries in the effects of oil prices on the trade 
balance. Rafiq et. al., (2016) examines long-run asymmetric effects of oil prices on the oil, nonoil and 
overall balances for 28 oil exporting countries and 40 oil importing countries between 1980-2011. 
They find that an oil price decrease has a negative impact for oil importers and a positive impact for 
oil exporters. They argue that this reflects higher oil demand following an oil price fall. Since Rafiq et. 
al., (2016) do not differentiate between oil supply and oil demand shocks, the asymmetries they 
identify may be related to one shock but not the other. Indeed, as we will show, our results suggest 
that an oil price decrease is only detrimental to oil importers if it results from a fall in oil demand due 
to low global real economic activity. If the oil price fall results from an oil supply expansion, it will have 
the expected positive impacts for oil importers, as seen with the most recent oil price fall. 
In sum, the oil price-trade balance literature has found that oil supply and demand shocks have 
different impacts on trade balances, but the literature has ignored potential asymmetries in these 
effects. Studies that consider these asymmetric effects of oil prices on the trade balance do not 
distinguish between oil supply and demand shocks. This paper bridges this gap in the literature by 
examining asymmetric impacts of oil supply shocks, oil demand shocks, and aggregate demand shocks 
on the trade balances of many oil exporting and oil importing countries. 
 
3. Rationale for Asymmetric Responses of External Balances to Oil Supply and Demand Shocks 
In the oil price-macroeconomy literature, the theoretical justifications for asymmetries in the effects 
of oil prices on output growth include the nonlinear roles of sectoral reallocation of labour and capital, 
of oil price uncertainty, and of monetary policy (see Herrera et. al., 2015). This literature, however, 
has no implications for asymmetries in the effects of oil shocks that are specific to oil supply, aggregate 
demand and oil market specific demand. In this section, we recount the theoretical channels of 
transmission of oil supply and demand shocks to the trade balance, and we use evidence from the 
data and implications from the empirical literature to provide potential sources of asymmetries in the 
effects of these shocks. 
3.1. Oil Supply Shocks 
The theoretical model in Bodenstein et.al., (2011) shows that, under incomplete financial markets and 
a low price elasticity of demand for oil, an oil supply disruption raises the price of oil and generates an 
oil trade deficit for oil importing countries. Since a higher oil price leads to a wealth transfer towards 
oil exporting countries, a supply disruption also generates a non-oil trade surplus for oil importers 
through higher demand for their exports by the now richer oil exporters. The impact on the overall 
trade balance of oil importers depends on the extent of the non-oil surplus, which is in turn 
determined by the degree of financial market completeness. The model predicts the exact opposite 
response of the trade balance of oil exporters.  Other studies have also found indirect transmission 
mechanisms of oil shocks to the trade balance working through the level of economic activity in 
trading partner countries. In particular, oil exporting countries sometimes experience indirect 
negative effects of higher oil prices as a result of lower economic activity in their oil importing trading 
partners, while some oil importers benefit from oil price increases due to higher demand from their 
oil-exporting trading partners (see Korhonen and Ledyaeva, 2010; Taghizadeh-Hesary et al., 2013). 
This literature, however, has no implications for asymmetric impacts. 
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We argue that oil supply disruptions may have a lower effect than oil supply expansions, because an 
oil supply disruption from one country can be offset by increased oil production from countries with 
spare capacity. In practice, Saudi Arabia is the only oil producer that maintains large spare capacity 
which can be brought on quickly, and it often offsets supply disruptions from both OPEC and non-
OPEC oil producers (Fattouh and Sen 2015; Fattouh 2014). The incentive for Saudi Arabia is to 
maximise both market share and oil revenues while stabilising the oil market.  
Indeed, studies that explicitly model oil supply shocks have found that supply disruptions have 
negligible effects on the economy. Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016) find that supply disruptions from 
small oil producing countries have little impact on global output; Kilian (2009) and Kilian et. al., (2009)  
find that supply disruptions have muted effects on oil prices and external balances, and that most of 
the effects commonly attributed to these disruptions actually result from increases in precautionary 
oil demand. In addition, Fattouh (2014) shows that supply losses in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region during the 2011-2013 period did not affect oil prices because growth in oil supply from 
the U.S and Saudi made up for those losses.  
By contrast, this counter-supply mechanism rarely governs oil supply expansions. Unlike for supply 
disruptions, there is no incentive for a single oil producer to cut supply while other producers reap the 
benefits. The most effective counter supply response would be a cooperative effort by many oil 
producers to cut supply, notably by Saudi-led OPEC. Historically, this has proved difficult because of a 
lack of internal cohesion within OPEC, the absence of a formal quota enforcement system in OPEC, 
and the risk of appropriation of the supply cut benefits by non-OPEC producers (Fattouh and Sen 
2015). Indeed, after the early 1980s, the response of oil producers to supply expansions has been to 
maximise market share by expanding production, subject to capacity limits, to compensate their falling 
oil revenues (Mohaddes and Pesaran, 2017, Fattouh and Sen 2015). In contrast to the muted empirical 
effects of supply disruptions, Mohaddes and Raissi (2019) find that an oil supply expansion such as the 
recent US oil supply revolution has significant global macroeconomic consequences. 
Figure 1 shows evidence in support of these arguments. Periods of OPEC supply disruptions, such as 
the 1990/1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2010/2011 Iranian sanctions, were more than offset by 
increased Saudi production, and periods of lower non-OPEC supply in 1989 and in 1992/1993 were 
offset by higher OPEC supply. By contrast, Saudi does not cut its supply during periods of OPEC and 
non-OPEC supply expansions, unless these periods coincide with weak oil demand or price targeting 
efforts by OPEC. For instance, Saudi cut supply in the early 1980s following weak demand from 
developed countries, in 1987 to help re-unite OPEC, in 1998/1999 during the Asian crisis, and in 
2000/2001, 2006/2007 and 2009 in response to slowing US demand (see Baffes et. al., 2015 for a 
detailed account of these shocks). For all other periods of OPEC and non-OPEC supply expansions, 
Saudi either expands its own supply or leaves it unchanged. 
Overall, therefore, oil supply disruptions may have lower impacts than oil supply expansions because 
counter-supply shocks can reduce the effects of supply disruptions, but are more difficult to achieve 
in the case of supply expansions. 
 
3.2. Aggregate demand shocks 
Theoretically, the transmission mechanism of aggregate demand shocks to the trade balance is quite 
different from that of oil specific demand and supply shocks. While an aggregate demand shock 
raises the price of oil and is associated with an oil trade deficit for oil importing countries, its effect 
on the nonoil trade balance is ambiguous (Bodenstein et. al., 2011; Kilain et. al., 2009). This is 
because an aggregate demand shock also provides an economic stimulus to oil importing countries, 
potentially leading to a non-oil trade deficit which can counteract the non-oil surplus implied by the 
higher price of crude oil. The opposite is true for oil exporters. In addition, indirect effects of oil price 
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changes through trading partners (Taghizadeh-Hesary et al., 2013) may be stronger in the case of 
aggregate demand shocks, since these shocks have more direct implications for GDP and economic 
activity across countries. 
Here, we argue that aggregate demand shocks can have asymmetric effects, in that both increases 
and decreases in global real economic activity can deteriorate trade balances for oil importers and 
improve them for oil exporters. Generally, global recessions emanate from globally important 
economies that also dominate oil demand: developed economies such as the US and EU, and emerging 
market economies such as China and India. The emergence of China as an important global economic 
player has diversified the world economy so that recessions in developed countries is not necessarily 
associated with recessions in emerging markets. Faced with lower commodity prices generated by a 
recession elsewhere, these countries can increase demand, leading to a deterioration in their trade 
balances. 
The literature has found that the effects of global recessions across countries depend on the origin of 
the recession- effects are higher for countries with close economic ties to the slowing economy. For 
instance, it is argued that China’s resilience during the GFC limited global economic contraction by 
reducing the exposure of countries with close economic ties to China (Roach, 2017, Cashin et al., 
2017). Empirically, Cashin et. al., (2017) find that a slowdown in China’s GDP growth has muted 
impacts on developed countries, despite increased trade links over the past few decades. Similarly, 
International Monetary Fund (2014) find that output shocks emanating from China, EU and US have 
insignificant impacts on India, just as output shocks in India do not affect these countries. It thus 
appears that during global recessions, some important oil importers remain rich enough to take 
advantage of lower oil prices by increasing oil demand. 
To illustrate the heterogeneous impacts of global recessions during episodes of oil price changes, 
Figure 2 presents real world GDP growth, changes in the real oil price, and GDP growth in China and 
the US. Baffes et al., (2015) provide a historical account oil shocks associated with changes in global 
demand. The period of high oil prices attributed to strong global demand, 2002-2005, is also 
associated with strong economic growth in both China and the US. On the other hand, periods of lower 
oil prices associated with weak global demand are the early 1980s recession, the 1990/1991 US 
recession, the 1997/1998 Asian crisis, the 2000/2001 US recession, and the 2008/2009 GFC. Figure 2 
shows that each period of oil price decline driven by a slower US economy is associated with very 
strong growth in China. Similarly, during the Asian crisis that saw one of the most dramatic fall in oil 
prices, the US maintained robust growth rates. 
Overall, therefore, lower oil prices driven by weak global demand will have heterogeneous impacts on 
countries: trade balances may deteriorate for oil importers that remain rich during the global 
recession. Our empirical strategy accounts for this heterogeneity in estimating an average effect of 
lower aggregate demand for both oil importers and exporters.  
3.3. Oil-Specific Demand Shocks 
Theoretically, the transmission mechanism of oil-demand shocks that are specific to the oil market, 
such as precautionary oil demand resulting from uncertainty about a future supply shortfall, is 
qualitatively similar to that of oil supply shocks (see section 3.1), but this shock can lead to a more 
persistent oil trade deficit for oil importers (Bodenstein et. al., 2011; Kilian et. al., 2009).3 
 
 
3 Studies have shown that speculative oil demand played a major role in the sustained oil price increases 
between early 1980’s and 2011 (Taghizadeh-Hesary, 2016), and also after the Global Financial Crisis, when 
weak US dollar exchange rates drove investors to invest in oil and other commodity markets (Taghizadeh-
Hesary and Yoshino, 2014). 
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Oil specific demand shocks may also have asymmetric impacts on the trade balance. To the extent 
that an increase in oil specific demand is associated with oil market uncertainty and volatility in oil 
prices, as advanced by Kilian (2009), it should increase the oil price and deteriorate the trade 
balances of oil importers while improving those of oil exporters.   If, however, a decrease in oil 
specific demand simply reflects lower oil market volatility and more certain expectations about 
future oil supply, it may not significantly lower the price of oil. In fact, lower volatility can be 
associated with lower precautionary savings and higher spending on both oil and nonoil goods; it 
encourages irreversible consumption and investment expenditure (Bernanke, 1980, Bloom, 2009, 
Kilian and Vigfusson 2011b). This implies that oil price increases resulting from precautionary oil 
demand may have a higher impact than oil price decreases resulting from lower precautionary oil 
demand.  
Overall, therefore, the literature and data point to possible asymmetries in the effects of oil supply 
shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and oil specific demand shocks on external balances. We proceed 
to estimate these effects in the following section. 
 
4.  Methods and Data 
This paper uses a two-step procedure to estimate the asymmetric impacts of oil supply and demand 
shocks on external balances. In the first stage, we decompose oil shocks into oil supply shocks, shocks 
to global real economic activity, and oil market specific demand shocks.  In the second stage, we 
estimate the linear and asymmetric effects of these shocks on the trade balances of oil importing and 
exporting countries.  
4.1. Decomposing oil price shocks. 
To decompose the oil shocks, we follow Kilian (2009) and estimate a Structural Vector Autoregressive 
(SVAR) model for the real oil price using data on global crude oil production, global real economic 
activity and the real oil price. We use monthly data from 1974 to 2016 and estimate the following 
SVAR: 
𝐴0𝑌𝑡 =  𝛾 + ∑ 𝐴𝑖
24
𝑖=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡….. (1) 
Where 𝑌𝑡 is a vector of three variable thus: 
𝑌𝑡 = (∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡, 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡, 𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑡)………… (2) 
Where ∆𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑡 is the percent change in global crude oil production, 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 is Kilian (2009) index of 
global real economic activity. Kilian (2009) derives this as the detrended average growth rates of dry 
cargo single voyage freight rates. It is designed to capture global aggregate demand for all industrial 
commodities, including oil. 𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑡  is the log real oil price and 𝜀𝑡  is a vector of serially and mutually 
uncorrelated structural innovations. We include up to two years’ worth of lags to allow for delayed 
responses in the VAR4. We assume 𝐴0
−1  has a recursive structure and we rely on the identifying 
assumptions in Kilian (2009).  In particular, we assume that in setting oil supply, oil exporters can 
respond to lagged changes in oil prices, global real economic activity and oil production, but will not 
respond to changes to oil market specific demand within the same month due to uncertainty in crude 
oil markets. We also assume that oil price increases resulting from oil specific demand shocks will not 
affect global real economic activity within the same month given the typically sluggish response of 
global real aggregates to oil market shocks (Kilian et. al., 2009). Finally, we assume that changes in the 
 
4 We follow Kilian et. al. (2009) in choosing a maximum lag of 24 months. Note that and using alternative lag 
order selection methods does not change the main results. 
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oil price that are not due to changes in aggregate demand or oil supply are driven by oil market specific 
changes in demand.5 
 The reduced form errors 𝑒𝑡 = 𝐴0
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) ….. (3) 
Where 𝜀𝑡
𝑜𝑠 refers to crude oil supply shocks, 𝜀𝑡
𝑎𝑔𝑑
 refers to shocks to global aggregate demand for all 
industrial commodities (or aggregate demand shocks), and 𝜀𝑡
𝑜𝑑 refers to oil market specific demand 
shocks. The latter would capture changes in precautionary demand for oil, for example in response to 




𝑜𝑑  represent increases in aggregate demand and oil specific demand, and imply an 
increase in the price of oil. By contrast, positive values for 𝜀𝑡
𝑜𝑠 represent higher oil supply and imply a 
decrease in the price of oil. Regarding the effects of these shocks on oil prices, Kilian (2009) and Kilian 
et. al., (2009) show that oil supply disruptions have a small and transitory impact on real oil prices, 
while oil specific and aggregate demand increases have a large and sustained oil price effect. 
To include these monthly shocks in our panel data regressions, where we use annual data from 1980-







𝑖  12𝑚=1 , 𝑖 = 1, … ,3 …. (4) 
Where 𝜉𝑡
𝑖
 is the annual average of 𝜀?̂?,𝑚
𝑖 , the 𝑖th structural shock of the 𝑚th month in year 𝑡; 𝑖 = 1 … 3 
correspond to oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and oil market specific demand shocks. As 
discussed in Kilian et. al., (2009), decomposing oil price changes in this way enables us to allow for 
reverse causality between global income levels and the price of oil, so that we depart from the bulk 
of the OPM literature that assumes exogenous oil prices. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the oil shocks 
over the 1980-2011 period. 
4.2. Model Estimations  
Before estimating the panel regressions, we first examine the time series properties of the data. We 
divide our sample into three sub-samples: oil exporters, high and middle-income oil importers, and a 
full sample of oil importers. We examine high and middle-income oil importers separately to facilitate 
comparison with previous studies, particularly Kilian et. al. (2007, 2009) and Rafiq et. al. (2016). For 
each sub-sample, we test for unit roots and co-integration using a variety of methods- discussions of 
these tests and the associated results are presented in Appendix A. Overall, the results indicate a mix 
of stationary and non-stationary variables, and no co-integration. We therefore focus on estimating 
short-run relationships using all variables in first difference except the oil shocks; these shocks are 
stationary and their first differences have no straightforward interpretation.  
We first estimate the following linear panel regression model 




𝑜𝑑 + 𝛽4∆log (𝑅𝐸𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5∆log (𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 ……. (5) 
 
5 This decomposing method may be unable to explain the correlation between speculative shocks and 
aggregate demand shocks. For instance, an expansionary monetary policy that reduces the interest rate may 
lead to an increase in investment and hence aggregate demand. At the same time, a reduced interest rate 
lowers the cost of borrowing and may increase the demand for credit and other commodities, including oil 
(speculative demand). We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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Where ∆𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is the change in the overall trade balance, oil trade balance or non-oil trade balance of 




𝑜𝑑  are lagged oil supply 
shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and oil specific demand shocks. We include a one year lag to ensure 
that the shocks are predetermined with respect to the trade balance6. 𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lagged real US 
dollar exchange rate of country 𝑖, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 is the lagged real GDP of country 𝑖, 𝜆𝑖 is a linear time trend 
to capture the impact of stationary time varying omitted variables, and 𝜇𝑡 is the error term. Although 
the monthly structural shocks from the SVAR model (1) are orthogonal, there is some correlation 
between the average annual shocks, as shown in Appendix F. Therefore, we include all the shocks in 
one model to limit potential omitted variable bias, rather than adopting an equation-by-equation 
approach. 








, 𝑖 = 1, … ,3      and   𝜉𝑡−1
𝑖− = {
𝜉𝑡−1 




, 𝑖 = 1, … . ,3……… (6) 
Where 𝜉𝑡−1
𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … ,3  refers to oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks and oil specific demand 
shocks.  We then estimate the following asymmetric models: 








𝑜𝑑− + 𝛽7∆log (𝑅𝐸𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽8∆log (𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 ……. (7) 
Where ∆𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 is the overall trade balance, oil trade balance or non-oil trade balance of country 𝑖 at 
year 𝑡. 𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑠+and 𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑠−  are positive and negative shocks to oil supply, 𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑑+and 𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑑−  are positive and 




 are positive and negative shocks to 
global real economic activity; other variables are as previously defined. 
We first estimate equations (5) and (7) by Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) and Mean Group 
(MG) models, the latter developed in Pesaran and Smith (1995). While the POLS model assumes that 
the effects of oil shocks are homogenous across countries, we report its results because, in its first 
difference representation, Eberhardt and Teal (2008) show that it is well behaved under CSD. The MG 
model assumes heterogeneous effects, for instance due to different levels of exposure to oil shocks. 
Both models ignore potential Cross Section Dependence (CSD). CSD occurs when the coefficients and 
residuals of different countries are correlated with one another due to common, unobserved, time 
variant shocks that have heterogeneous impacts on countries. If CSD exists and is unaccounted for, it 
can lead to identification problems by introducing some correlation between the error term and the 
regressors; POLS and MG models would be inconsistent. We test for CSD using the methods in Pesaran 
(2004, 2015). In testing for CSD, however, it is important to distinguish between weak and strong 
dependence, as only strong dependence causes problems for inference (Chudik et. al., 2011, Pesaran, 
2015). This is especially important in this paper because we already include crude oil supply and 
demand shocks as well as a proxy for global real income. Potentially, these variables can account for 
common macroeconomic factors in our models. 
 
6 Kilian et. al., (2009) argue that even the contemporaneous values of these annual shocks are predetermined 
with respect to trade balances, and show that this assumption generally holds for the US, the country for 
which it is least likely to hold. However, they still find some contemporaneous feedback between US oil trade 
balance and oil specific demand shocks. It is also difficult to rule out contemporaneous feedback between oil 
supply shocks and oil exporters’ trade balances. Therefore, unlike in Kilian et. al., (2009), we do not include 
contemporaneous shocks in our regressions to better rule out contemporaneous feedback. 
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To estimate the extent of CSD in our data, we follow the method in Bailey et. al., (2016). They develop 
the exponent of CSD,  𝛼 , as a measure of the degree of cross section dependence.  𝛼 lies between 0 
and 1:  0 ≤  𝛼 < 0.5 represents weak CSD, and 0.5 ≤  𝛼 < 1 represents different degrees of strong 
dependence. This method is useful in testing for CSD because Pesaran (2015) shows that, when the 
cross-section dimension of the data, 𝑁  , is much larger than the time dimension, 𝑇,  the implicit null 
of the Pesaran (2004) CSD test is weak dependence, where 0 ≤  𝛼 < 0.5, so that rejecting the CD test 
is rejecting both independence and weak dependence. However, when N and T are of the same order 
of magnitude, as in this paper, the CSD test loses power and its implicit null becomes 0 ≤  𝛼 < 0.25; 
the test tends to over-reject independence/weak dependence in the region 0.25 ≤  𝛼 < 0.5 
(Pesaran, 2015). Rejection of the test is, therefore, not equivalent to rejecting weak dependence. 
Thus, in addition to testing for CSD, we estimate the Bailey et. al., (2016) bias corrected exponent of 
CSD for all the variables as well as the residuals from POLS and MG models. Table 1 presents the CD 
tests and exponents of CSD for the variables; those for the regression residuals are presented in the 
the next section. We find evidence of strong dependence in real GDP, oil trade balance and overall 
trade balances for all groups of countries, but nonoil balances and real exchange rates are only weakly 
cross-sectionally correlated. As expected, the oil shocks are perfectly cross-sectionally correlated. In 
the regression models (5) and (7), we show in the next section that the residuals for POLS and MG 
models display varying degrees of both weak and strong dependence.  
To correct for bias resulting from the models with strong dependence, we estimate the Augmented 
Mean Group (AMG) model of Eberhardt and Teal (2008, 2010) and Bond and Eberhardt (2013). 
Applying the AMG model to (5) and (7) yields the first difference AMG model developed in Eberhardt 
and Teal, (2008). The AMG model accounts for CSD through a twostep method. First, the models in 
(5) and (7) are estimated in first differences by POLS, including first differenced year dummies. Second, 
the coefficients on the differenced year dummies are collected and included as an additional variable 
in MG models. These differenced year dummy coefficients capture the evolution of unobserved 
common factors over time: the Common Dynamic Process (CDP). In its first difference version, the 
AMG model augments the MG model with the first difference of the CDP (Eberhardt and Teal, 2008). 
The AMG estimators allow for parameter heterogeneity and error cross section dependence, and 
perform as well as Pesaran et. al., (2006) Common Correlated Effects Mean Group Estimator (CCEMG) 
in panels with CSD (Bond and Eberhardt, 2013). We choose the AMG over the CCEMG model because 
the latter produces highly counter intuitive and unstable results, with most p-values approaching 
unity, suggesting that the data rejects the model. This is perhaps because models (5) and (7) already 
contain more common variables than country specific ones. Since the CCE-type estimators further 
augment the models with cross section averages of the trade balance, real exchange rate and real 
GDP, they result in an 8-variable linear model, or an 11-variable asymmetric model, where only two 
variables, RER and GDP, are individual specific. We thus prefer the more parsimonious AMG model 
that eliminates CSD without the need for more than one additional variable. 
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4.3. Data 
We use annual data from 1980-2011 for a sample of 25 oil exporting countries, 43 high and middle- 
income oil importing countries, and a full sample of 76 oil importing countries. We classify countries 
as oil exporters based on two rules: (i) average oil exports over 1980-2011 are at least 20% of total 
exports, as in Kilian et. al., (2007, 2009) and (ii) average oil imports are less than 50% of oil exports. 
The latter rule eliminates oil exporters that have considerable oil imports, for example due to poorly 
developed refineries or depletion of oil reserves during the sample period. The countries eliminated 
are Bahrain, Egypt, Indonesia, and Mexico. The first column of Appendix B shows the list of oil 
exporters in our sample. Of the countries that do not satisfy rules (i) and (ii), we define oil importers 
as countries whose average oil exports are less than average oil imports over the period.  This 
eliminates countries where average oil exports are lower than 20% of total exports, but oil trade 
balances are, on average, positive.  The countries eliminated are Argentina, Canada, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Denmark, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom7. The second panel of Appendix B shows the 
full sample of oil importers. Furthermore, we classify high-income oil importers as US, Japan and 
developed Europe, as in Kilian et. al., (2009). Of the remaining oil importers, we follow Kilian et. al, 
(2007) and define middle income countries as those whose average PPP-weighted GDP is greater than 
the median value in our sample. These countries, along with the high-income group, constitute our 
sample of high and middle-income oil importers; these are listed in the third panel of Appendix B. The 
high and middle-income group excludes many low-income commodity exporters. Examining the 
effects on high and middle-income oil importers is important because studies have found that high-
income countries sometimes respond differently to oil price shocks. For instance, Taghizadeh-Hesary 
et al. (2016) find that GDP growth of the U.S and Japan (high-income countries) responds more to oil 
price shocks relative to GDP growth in China (emerging economy), whereas oil price fluctuations have 
a higher impact on China’s  inflation rate relative to the U.S and Japan. Our sample of high and middle-
income oil importers allow us to investigate such differences in the effects of oil shocks as they relate 
to external balances.8  
Appendix C provides the data sources, Appendix D presents the variable measurements, Appendix E 
provides descriptive statistics, and Appendix F presents pairwise correlations between the variables.  
5. Results 
We present the results from linear models (5) for oil exporters, high and middle-income oil importers, 
and the full sample of oil importers, as well as the corresponding results from nonlinear models (7). 
We present estimates from the POLS, MG and AMG models for each sub-sample. In discussing the 
results, we give less weight to the AMG in models where the MG or POLS results indicate low CSD, i.e., 
where 0 < 𝛼 ≤ 0.5. Where 𝛼 > 0.5 i.e. strong dependence, we prefer the AMG. 
5.1. Linear Models 
Table 2 shows the linear estimation results for oil exporters. As expected, oil supply expansions 
deteriorate the oil trade balance and overall trade balance. The nonoil balance, however, is 
unaffected. Increases in aggregate demand and oil specific demand improve oil and overall balances. 
The nonoil balance tends to improve with oil-specific demand shocks, but is unaffected by aggregate 
demand shocks. Unresponsive nonoil balances indicate a high degree of international financial risk 
 
7 Eliminating countries with ambiguous oil market status over the sample period also limits the degree to 
which countries ‘switch’ status from oil exporters to oil importers, or vice versa, over the sample period.  
8 Examining low-income oil importers separately does not provide significantly different results from those of 
the full oil importer sample. 
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sharing (Bodenstein et. al., 2011, Kilian et. al., 2009). All the oil shocks have the expected impacts on 
the trade balances of oil exporters, and are in line with the findings in Kilian et. al., (2009). 
For high and middle-income oil importers, Table 3 show that the effects of oil shocks reflect the results 
for oil exporters. The oil trade balance and the overall trade balance improve with oil supply 
expansions and deteriorate with increases in aggregate demand and oil-specific demand. The nonoil 
balance is unaffected by supply shocks and oil-specific demand shocks, but it deteriorates with 
aggregate demand shocks. This reflects the fact that higher aggregate demand not only increases the 
price of oil, but of nonoil commodities as well, leading to a nonoil deficit for commodity importers. 
This result is in line with Kilian et. al., (2009) and Bodenstein et. al., (2011). 
For the full sample of oil importers, Table 4 shows that the effects of all three shocks on the oil and 
overall trade balance remain the same as those for the high and middle-income group. Aggregate 
demand shocks continue to deteriorate the nonoil balance, suggesting that the inclusion of many low-
income commodity exporters does not alter the average nonoil response for oil importers. However, 
oil supply expansions improve the nonoil balance. Since this positive effect was insignificant for the 
high and middle-income group, it suggests that commodity exports increase with oil supply 
expansions, perhaps because a lower oil bill raises real purchasing power and hence demand for nonoil 
commodities.   
Overall, results from the linear models are consistent with expectations and with the findings of 
previous studies. Next, we turn to the nonlinear models in (7). 
5.2. Nonlinear Estimation Results 
5.2.1. Oil Exporters 
Table 5 shows the results for the nonlinear models in (7) for oil exporters. Oil supply expansions still 
deteriorate the oil and overall trade balances, but the effect is significant only for POLS and MG 
models, but not the AMG. Oil supply disruptions, however, have limited impacts: both the MG and 
AMG models show insignificant oil trade responses, while the POLS model shows a positive impact 
that is smaller than the effect of supply expansions. For nonoil and overall trade balances, the MG 
model shows a positive impact of supply disruptions and, for the overall balance, the effect is smaller 
than that of supply expansions. POLS and AMG models show no significant effects of supply 
disruptions on the nonoil and overall trade balances. Generally, the results suggest that oil supply 
expansions are more important than supply disruptions for oil exporters. This is consistent with the 
view that counter supply shocks limit the impact of supply disruptions. 
In response to an increase in aggregate demand, all three models show a statistically significant 
improvement in the oil and overall balances of oil exporters; the effect on the nonoil trade balance is 
insignificant. The effects of lower aggregate demand on oil and overall balances tend to be positive 
for the POLS and MG models, suggesting that lower real economic activity increases oil demand. 
However, as shown by the estimate of 𝛼, these models are affected by a moderately high degree of 
CSD.  The AMG model shows no significant impact of lower global real economic activity, suggesting 
that once CSD is accounted for, oil exporters need not be concerned about lower aggregate demand 
for commodities. 
Increases in oil specific demand, such as precautionary demand for oil, improve the oil, nonoil and 
overall balances of oil exporters; these effects are significant in the POLS and MG models but not in 
the AMG model, and so are not robust to CSD. Lower precautionary oil demand deteriorates the oil 
balance in the AMG model. The POLS and AMG show a deterioration of the nonoil balance, and all 
three models show a deterioration of the overall balance. Overall, therefore, lower precautionary oil 
demand is the most associated with oil, nonoil and overall trade deficits for oil exporters. 
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5.2.2. High and Middle-Income Oil Importers: 
Table 6 shows the results from nonlinear models in (7) for high and middle-income oil importers. Oil 
supply expansions lead to an improvement in the oil and overall balances. The nonoil balance also 
improves but this effect is significant only in the POLS model. Oil supply disruptions have more limited 
effects, with the MG model showing a small oil balance deterioration and the POLS model showing an 
overall balance deterioration. The effects of supply disruptions are insignificant in all other cases. 
Overall, as with oil exporters, the results for high and middle-income oil importers show that oil supply 
expansions are more important than supply disruptions 
Across all three models, both increases and decreases in aggregate demand deteriorate oil and overall 
trade balances for high and middle-income oil importers and, in most cases, the effect of demand 
decreases are generally larger than those of increases. The nonoil balance also deteriorates, but the 
effect is significant only in the POLS models. While a trade balance deterioration is expected with 
higher aggregate demand, the effects of lower aggregate demand suggest that strong demand for 
commodities is maintained by some oil importers despite recessions in others, as discussed in Section 
2.  
All three models show that increases in precautionary oil demand deteriorate the oil and overall trade 
balances for high and middle-income oil importers, although the oil trade response is insignificant in 
the AMG model. Lower precautionary oil demand improves the oil and overall balances in the AMG 
model, but not in the POLS and MG.  
5.2.3. Full sample of oil Importers: 
Table 7 shows the nonlinear results for the full sample of oil importers. As expected, oil supply 
expansions improve the oil and overall trade balances across all three models, although the overall 
trade response is insignificant in the AMG model. As with the high and middle-income group, the 
nonoil balance also improves, with the effect significant in the POLS model. Oil supply disruptions 
deteriorate the oil trade balance. However, this effect is smaller than the effects of supply expansions, 
and is insignificant in the AMG model. The nonoil and overall balances are unaffected by supply 
disruptions across all three models. Again, it appears that supply expansions are more important than 
supply disruptions. 
Increases in aggregate demand deteriorate the oil and overall trade balance across the three models, 
but the overall trade response is mostly insignificant. The nonoil balance is unaffected by higher 
aggregate demand. Across the three models, decreases in aggregate demand deteriorate the oil, 
nonoil and overall balances, but the effects are insignificant in the AMG model. These results are in 
line with those of the high and middle-income group, and suggest that lower commodity prices, driven 
by economic recessions in some countries, lead to higher commodity spending by other countries 
whose income growth remains strong.  
Increases in precautionary oil demand deteriorate the oil and overall balances across all three models, 
although the overall trade response is insignificant in the AMG. The nonoil balance is unaffected by 
higher precautionary oil demand. In response to lower precautionary oil demand, the MG and AMG 
models show an oil trade deterioration, and the AMG additionally shows a nonoil and overall trade 
deterioration. As discussed in Section 2, it appears that lower precautionary oil demand, associated 
with oil market stability, increases consumption and investment spending on both oil and nonoil
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goods. This asymmetry is evident for the full sample of oil importers, but not for oil exporters or high 
and middle-income oil importers. 
Overall, our results show asymmetries in the effects of supply and demand shocks in the oil market.   
Oil supply expansions are more important than supply disruptions for both oil exporting and oil 
importing countries’ trade balances. For oil importers, lower global real economic activity 
deteriorates, rather than improves, the trade balance.  The effects of precautionary oil demand are 
less conclusive, but point to possible asymmetries for oil importers, where lower precautionary 
demand is associated with a deterioration, rather than an improvement, in oil and overall balances.   
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
This paper has examined the asymmetric impacts of oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, and 
oil-specific demand shocks on trade balances for a large sample of oil exporting and oil importing 
countries, including economies in the MENA region. The literature has argued that, for 
macroeconomic performance, oil price increases are more important than decreases. However, the 
oil price- trade balance literature has largely ignored these asymmetries. Studies that consider 
asymmetric impacts on the trade balance do not account for the sources of oil price changes. This 
paper fills the gap in the literature by examining the effects of both increases and decreases in oil 
supply and demand shocks on external balances. 
This paper disentangles oil shocks using the SVAR methodology proposed by Kilian (2009), and 
estimates asymmetric impacts within a variety of panel data methods. We account for endogenous 
oil prices, parameter heterogeneity, nonstationarity, and error cross section dependence. We find 
asymmetries in the effects of oil supply shocks, which can be attributed to the role of Saudi Arabia in 
regulating supply. In particular, oil price increases driven by oil supply disruptions have little impact 
on trade balances because counter supply shocks in the crude oil market, often from Saudi Arabia, can 
make up for supply disruptions. On the other hand, given the challenges in achieving co-ordinated 
supply cuts across all oil exporters, oil supply expansions significantly affect trade balances. We find 
that, as expected, oil price increases driven by higher global real economic activity improves the trade 
balance for oil exporters and deteriorate it for oil importers. However, oil price declines arising from 
lower global real economic activity deteriorate oil importers’ trade balances, reflecting the fact that 
some countries maintain strong demand for commodities despite recessions in other parts of the 
world.  
Together, our findings imply that not all asymmetric impacts of oil prices are the same, and that the 
source of the oil shock matters for the type of asymmetry observed. Our results encompass the 
asymmetries identified by Rafiq et. al., (2016) as a special case: lower oil prices deteriorate the oil 
trade balance for oil importers only if those lower prices are driven by demand side shocks.  
Our results also have important policy implications for MENA oil exporters and oil importers. For oil 
importers, oil price increases should only be a concern if they result from demand side shocks. On the 
other hand, not all oil price declines improve trade balances for oil importers; lower oil prices are good 
news only if they are driven by supply expansions. For MENA oil exporters, the results suggest that 
policy makers should be more concerned about decreases in oil specific demand, such as 
precautionary oil demand or speculative oil demand, as these have a robust negative impact for oil 
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Figures and Tables: 
Figure 1: Percentage Changes in Saudi Arabia, OPEC and Non-OPEC supply- 1982-2011 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from US Energy Information Administration. 
Figure 2: Oil Prices and US, China and Global Real GDP Growth Rates
 
Source: Authors calculations using data from World Bank’s Word Development Indicators (WDI) and US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). 
Figure 3: Structural oil shocks- 1980-2011 
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Table 1: Pesaran (2015) Cross-Section Dependence Tests and Bailey et. al., (2016) Exponents of Cross-Section Dependence 
 Oil exporters High and Middle-Income 
Oil importers 
Full Sample Oil importers Oil Shocks 
Variable CD ?̂?0.05
∗  ?̂? ?̂?0.95
∗  N CD ?̂?0.05
∗  ?̂? ?̂?0.95
∗  N CD ?̂?0.05
∗  ?̂? ?̂?0.95
∗  N Variable CD ?̂?0.05
∗  ?̂? ?̂?0.95
∗  N 
∆𝑂𝑇𝐵 12.178 0.731 0.808 0.885 660 18.495 0.759 0.846 0.934 1218 35.255 0.796 0.853 0.910 2205 𝜉𝑜𝑠 94.790 0.940 1.005 1.070 775 
∆𝑁𝑇𝐵 1.687 0.481 0.552 0.623 660 1.807 0.410 0.478 0.545 1218 1.933 0.428 0.483 0.538 2205 𝜉𝑎𝑔𝑑  94.790 0.917 1.005 1.093 775 
∆𝑇𝑇𝐵 7.680 0.713 0.800 0.886 757 14.758 0.759 0.840 0.921 1333 25.079 0.769 0.845 0.922 2306 𝜉𝑜𝑑 94.790 0.923 1.005 1.087 775 
∆ln (𝑅𝐸𝑅 3.838 0.497 0.574 0.651 728 18.666 0.225 0.365 0.505 1168 22.044 0.213 0.303 0.394 2177       
∆ln (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃) 4.715 0.746 0.824 0.901 734 18.414 0.854 0.947 1.041 1294 17.554 0.868 0.927 0.987 2272       
Notes: * represent 90% level confidence bands. ?̂? is the bias-corrected exponent of cross section dependence in Bailey et. al., (2016). CD is Pesaran (2015) Cross-section dependence test. 
N is the number of observations. 
 
Table 2: Linear effects of oil price shocks on oil exporters’ trade balances 
 
Linear Oil Exporters 
 Oil Trade Balance Nonoil Trade Balance Overall Trade Balance 
 POLS MG AMG POLS MG AMG POLS MG AMG 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑠  -0.021 -0.032** -0.058*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.021 -0.024 -0.032*** -0.198*** 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.015] [0.013] [0.013] [0.019] [0.009] [0.031] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑔𝑑
 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.001 -0.007 -0.002 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.104*** 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.011] [0.011] [0.018] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑑  0.030*** 0.031*** 0.084*** 0.009 0.016** 0.003 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.052*** 
 [0.009] [0.008] [0.011] [0.008] [0.006] [0.004] [0.012] [0.010] [0.011] 
∆ln (𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡−1) 0.010 -0.012 -0.007 0.010 -0.002 -0.015 0.020 0.005 0.012 
 [0.016] [0.030] [0.013] [0.018] [0.022] [0.022] [0.019] [0.033] [0.027] 
∆ln (𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−1) 0.086 -0.056 -0.024 0.054 -0.028 0.017 0.117 -0.060 0.001 
 [0.059] [0.055] [0.039] [0.073] [0.049] [0.055] [0.100] [0.088] [0.059] 
CDP   0.967***   0.413***   0.991*** 
   [0.144]   [0.107]   [0.138] 
CD 12.71 9.70 1.75 2.17 1.89 1.71 11.37 10.80 2.42 
𝛼 0.83 0.80 0.17 -0.36 0.48 0.16 0.81 0.81 0.09 
RMSE 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.07 
N 611 611 611 611 611 611 689 689 689 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Standard errors in parenthesis. POLS is the Polled Ordinary Least Squares model, MG is Pesaran and Smith (1995) Mean Group model, AMG is Eberhardt and 
Teal (2008, 2010) and Bond and Eberhardt (2013) model. CDP is the Common Dynamic Process, CD is Pesaran (2015) Cross section Dependence test, 𝛼 is Bailey et. al., (2016) bias 
adjusted exponent of Cross Section Dependence. RMSE is the Root Mean Square Error. N is the number of observations. All the variables are as defined in equation (5). 
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Table 3: Linear effects of oil price shocks on high and middle-income oil importers’ trade balances 
 Oil Trade Balance Nonoil Trade Balance Overall Trade Balance 
 POLS MG AMG POLS MG AMG POLS MG AMG 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑠  0.003 0.005*** 0.011*** 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.008** 0.012*** 
 [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.007] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.003] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑔𝑑
 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.021*** -0.009** -0.004 -0.029*** -0.019*** -0.007** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑑  -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.009*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006* -0.010*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] 
∆ln (𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡−1) 0.008 0.004 -0.005* -0.012 0.004 0.007 -0.005 0.015** -0.012 
 [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.007] [0.012] 
∆ln (𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−1) 0.017 0.014 0.011 -0.068 -0.093*** -0.069 -0.016 -0.072** -0.080** 
 [0.019] [0.012] [0.010] [0.045] [0.032] [0.044] [0.045] [0.031] [0.040] 
CDP   0.726***   0.477***   0.596*** 
   [0.078]   [0.176]   [0.143] 
CD 3.25 9.75 -0.58 0.53 -0.70 -2.47 10.68 2.52 -1.90 
𝛼 0.54 0.74 0.38 -0.44 0.33 0.04 0.80 0.50 0.18 
RMSE 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
N 1,020 1,017 1,010 1,020 1,017 1,010 1,098 1,098 1,098 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis. See notes under Table 2. 
Table 4: Linear effects of oil price shocks on the full sample of oil importers’ trade balance 
 Oil Trade Balance Nonoil Trade Balance Overall Trade Balance 
 POLS MG AMG POLS MG AMG POLS MG AMG 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑠  0.005** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.008* 0.009** 0.005 0.012** 0.011*** 0.014*** 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑔𝑑
 -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.018*** -0.008*** -0.003 -0.028*** -0.017*** -0.006** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑑  -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.011*** 0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.007** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
∆ln (𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡−1) 0.000 0.003 -0.005** -0.000 0.003 0.005 -0.000 0.010 0.001 
 [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.008] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] 
∆ln (𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−1) 0.003 0.017* 0.011 -0.021 -0.062*** -0.056* -0.009 -0.045* -0.058* 
 [0.007] [0.009] [0.008] [0.022] [0.024] [0.030] [0.022] [0.025] [0.030] 
CDP   0.769***   0.764***   0.839*** 
   [0.064]   [0.169]   [0.131] 
CD 6.00 18.64 -1.56 0.78 0.46 -1.83 21.53 4.41 1.62 
𝛼 0.58 0.76 -0.27 -0.32 0.43 0.23 0.79 0.55 0.26 
RMSE 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 
N 1,946 1,943 1,936 1,946 1,943 1,936 2,040 2,040 2,040 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis. See notes under Table 2. 
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Table 5: Asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on oil exporters’ trade balances 
 Oil Trade Balance Nonoil Trade Balance Overall Trade Balance 
 POLS MG AMG POLS MG AMG POLS MG AMG 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑠+ -0.096*** -0.077*** 0.001 0.012 0.007 0.020 -0.094** -0.100*** 0.006 
 [0.029] [0.027] [0.020] [0.035] [0.031] [0.035] [0.039] [0.025] [0.020] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑠− 0.063** 0.016 -0.014 -0.014 0.031** 0.025 0.054 0.042** -0.018 
 [0.028] [0.023] [0.020] [0.030] [0.015] [0.020] [0.034] [0.020] [0.016] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑔𝑑+
 0.032*** 0.049*** 0.074*** 0.016 -0.001 0.006 0.041*** 0.076*** 0.097*** 
 [0.012] [0.019] [0.016] [0.012] [0.008] [0.009] [0.015] [0.021] [0.025] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑔𝑑−
 0.090*** 0.041 -0.010 0.007 -0.009 -0.007 0.109*** 0.058* -0.005 
 [0.022] [0.026] [0.026] [0.023] [0.012] [0.014] [0.032] [0.031] [0.027] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑑+ 0.111*** 0.089*** -0.009 0.056*** 0.039* 0.033 0.165*** 0.178*** -0.019 
 [0.018] [0.019] [0.024] [0.019] [0.022] [0.021] [0.023] [0.031] [0.027] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑑− -0.009 -0.015 -0.116*** -0.035** -0.012 -0.039** -0.043** -0.044*** -0.174*** 
 [0.013] [0.012] [0.023] [0.017] [0.016] [0.018] [0.018] [0.015] [0.032] 
∆ln (𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡−1) 0.010 -0.013 -0.021 0.008 -0.024 -0.044* 0.016 0.005 -0.017 
 [0.016] [0.027] [0.020] [0.018] [0.024] [0.023] [0.018] [0.030] [0.041] 
∆ln (𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−1) 0.104* -0.005 0.007 0.062 -0.053 0.008 0.134 0.002 0.022 
 [0.060] [0.056] [0.057] [0.074] [0.076] [0.075] [0.102] [0.104] [0.073] 
CDP   0.911***   0.374***   0.961*** 
   [0.145]   [0.098]   [0.148] 
CD 10.72 9.55 1.26 2.55 2.26 1.33 8.45 8.63 -2.37 
𝛼 0.78 0.79 0.24 0.38 0.49 0.23 0.65 0.79 0.02 
RMSE 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.06 
N 611 611 611 611 611 611 689 689 689 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 Standard errors in parenthesis. POLS is the Polled Ordinary Least Squares model, MG is Pesaran and Smith (1995) Mean Group model, AMG is Eberhardt and 
Teal (2008, 2010) and Bond and Eberhardt (2013) model. CDP is the Common Dynamic Process, CD is Pesaran (2015) Cross section Dependence test, 𝛼 is Bailey et. al., (2016) bias 















Table 6: Asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on high and middle-income oil importers’ trade balances 
 Oil Trade Balance Nonoil Trade Balance Overall Trade Balance 
 POLS MG AMG POLS MG AMG POLS MG AMG 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑠+ 0.015** 0.017*** 0.008*** 0.031** 0.015 0.012 0.043*** 0.025** 0.006 
 [0.007] [0.003] [0.003] [0.015] [0.012] [0.012] [0.015] [0.011] [0.012] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑠− -0.011 -0.008*** 0.002 -0.024 0.011 0.007 -0.035** -0.005 0.010 
 [0.006] [0.003] [0.003] [0.015] [0.008] [0.010] [0.015] [0.009] [0.011] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑔𝑑+
 -0.010*** -0.005** -0.017*** -0.013* -0.005 -0.002 -0.021*** -0.009 -0.015** 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.007] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑔𝑑−
 -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.004* -0.031*** -0.011 -0.007 -0.049*** -0.028*** -0.025** 
 [0.006] [0.003] [0.002] [0.011] [0.008] [0.008] [0.012] [0.008] [0.010] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑑+ -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.003 0.003 -0.014 -0.016* -0.023** -0.034*** -0.023*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑑− 0.002 -0.002* 0.015*** -0.009 0.006 0.004 -0.007 0.002 0.013*** 
 [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] 
∆ln (𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡−1) 0.005 -0.001 -0.008*** -0.018 -0.008 0.001 -0.013 -0.004 -0.018 
 [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.013] [0.012] [0.014] [0.013] [0.010] [0.012] 
∆ln (𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−1) 0.013 0.012 0.018 -0.059 -0.187*** -0.131** -0.014 -0.157*** -0.170*** 
 [0.018] [0.011] [0.011] [0.044] [0.041] [0.054] [0.044] [0.039] [0.049] 
CDP   0.686***   0.283*   0.529*** 
   [0.079]   [0.147]   [0.154] 
CD 2.30 9.31 -1.02 -0.78 -1.02 2.12 9.41 2.14 -1.0 
𝛼 -0.39 0.76 0.30 -0.53 0.30 0.14 0.77 0.48 0.30 
RMSE 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
N 1,020 1,010 1,010 1,020 1,010 1,010 1,098 1,098 1,098 
















Table 7: Asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on oil importers’ trade balance 
 Oil Trade Balance Nonoil Trade Balance Overall Trade Balance 
 POLS MG AMG POLS MG AMG POLS MG AMG 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑠+ 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.005** 0.021* 0.014 0.007 0.037*** 0.024*** 0.010 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.010] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑠− -0.009** -0.008*** -0.001 -0.006 0.005 0.007 -0.017 -0.006 0.005 
 [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.011] [0.008] [0.010] [0.011] [0.008] [0.010] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑔𝑑+
 -0.011*** -0.006*** -0.015*** -0.007 -0.002 0.001 -0.017*** -0.006 -0.008 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑔𝑑−
 -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.001 -0.034*** -0.017*** -0.006 -0.053*** -0.039*** -0.014 
 [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.009] [0.006] [0.011] [0.009] [0.007] [0.009] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑑+ -0.027*** -0.021*** -0.001 0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.012* 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
𝜉𝑡−1
𝑜𝑑− 0.001 -0.003*** -0.017*** -0.005 0.002 -0.016** -0.004 -0.002 -0.032*** 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.005] [0.004] [0.009] 
∆ln (𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑡−1) 0.000 0.000 -0.006** -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.009] [0.010] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] 
∆ln (𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−1) 0.004 0.007 0.019** -0.021 -0.123*** -0.091** -0.009 -0.105*** -0.100*** 
 [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.022] [0.031] [0.037] [0.022] [0.031] [0.037] 
CDP   0.746***   0.610***   0.692*** 
   [0.067]   [0.181]   [0.145] 
CD 4.23 15.05 -1.63 0.64 -0.31 -1.20 15.00 2.97 1.08 
𝛼 0.50 0.70 0.26 -0.32 0.38 0.34 0.75 0.51 0.32 
RMSE 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
N 1,946 1,936 1,936 1,946 1,936 1,936 2,040 2,040 2,040 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis. See notes under Table 5
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Appendices: 
Appendix A: Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
For each sub-sample, we test for unit roots using the Maddala and Wu (1999) tests and Pesaran (2007) 
tests, the latter valid in the presence of error Cross Section Dependence (CSD). Both tests allow for 
heterogenous parameters across panel members and test the null hypothesis of a unit root against 
the alternative that at least one panel member’s series is stationary. Table A shows the results from 
the unit root tests. Generally, we cannot rule out nonstationarity in the oil trade balance, nonoil trade 
balance, overall trade balance, real exchange rates and real GDP for all three country groups. This is 
especially true when we consider the Pesaran (2007) test that accounts for CSD. We expect the three 
oil shocks in (4) to be stationary since they are averages of structural residuals implied by (1). To test 
for unit roots in these shocks, we employ the Maddala and Wu (1999) test and Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003) test, rather than the Pesaran (2007) test. This is because the shocks, identical across countries 
in each year, are equal to their cross-section averages. Since the Pesaran (2007) test augments 
standard ADF regressions with cross section averages of the series, it does not consistently estimate 
the test, and it produces perfect p-values of unity. Table A shows that, as expected, these series are 
stationary. 
Given that we have a mix of stationary and nonstationary regressors, we expect no cointegration 
among the variables. Moreover, the monthly shocks implied by (1), from which the annual shocks are 
derived, are orthogonal by construction. Nevertheless, there is non-zero correlation between the 
annual shocks9, so we test for cointegration using the Pedroni (1999) test and the Westerlund (2007) 
error correction tests, the latter valid under CSD. The results, presented in Table B and Table C, show 
that the variables do not cointegrate for all three groups of countries. Based on these results, and the 
results from our unit root tests, we focus on estimating short-run relationships using all variables in 
first difference except the oil shocks; these shocks are stationary and, in our context, their first 
differences have no straightforward interpretation. The first difference representation of the models 
also limit omitted variable bias through accounting for individual country-specific characteristics. 
 
 
9 Pairwise correlation coefficients between all variables are presented in Appendix E 
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Table A: Unit Root Tests 
  Madalla and Wu (1999) Unit root tests Pesaran (2007) Unit root tests Madalla and Wu (1999)  
Unit root tests- Oil Shocks 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003)  
Unit root test- Oil Shocks 
 




 Oil Importers 
Oil 
Exporters 







Variable lags   
TTB 0 150.88*** 177.75*** 306.49*** -3.70*** -3.56*** -5.37*** 𝜉𝑜𝑠 0 2402.34*** Variable   
1 150.15*** 145.88*** 230.20*** -2.69*** -0.88 -1.57*  1 1417.26*** 𝜉𝑜𝑠 -42.48***  
2 81.78*** 132.83*** 186.68** -1.05 1.28 1.31  2 722.15*** 𝜉𝑎𝑔𝑑 -51.08***  
3 63.73* 109.27** 173.24 -0.6 3.15 2.95  3 482.34*** 𝜉𝑜𝑑 -28.38***  
4 56.33 107.92* 169.63 1.64 5.71 5.3  4 965.68***   
NTB 0 149.17*** 131.59*** 298.46*** -4.81*** -1.54* -4.56*** 𝜉𝑎𝑔𝑑 0 2764.22***    
1 114.06*** 113.39** 209.91*** -2.53*** -0.71 -2.18**  1 704.69***    
2 61.82 102.46 163.85 -0.19 -0.25 -0.59  2 176.69*    
3 51.89 84.92 149.26 0.74 2.95 1.37  3 196.51***    
4 40.12 109.32** 173.64 3.62 4.01 4.86  4 179.64*   
OTB 0 91.40*** 89.91 170.08 -0.79 -5.79*** -7.03*** 𝜉𝑜𝑑 0 2463.45***    
1 101.20*** 92.98 148.42 -0.95 -6.60*** -4.71***  1 1503.23***    
2 51.15 144.37*** 196.80*** -0.25 -1.93** -0.66  2 812.37***    
3 63.78* 102.59 143.52 -2.44*** 0.11 2.32  3 603.99***    
4 74.35** 230.07*** 260.39*** 2.46 1.18 3.94  4 261.46***   
∆ln (𝑅𝐸𝑅 0 28.73 116.27** 182.66** -1.31* 2.00 2.70       
1 55.97 109.17** 160.15 -3.56*** -4.70*** -1.82**       
2 37.85 79.08 119.94 -2.12** 3.51 4.59       
3 98.21*** 95.47 151.7 -3.76*** 4.73 4.49       
4 97.52*** 109.58** 141.95 0.03 4.38 5.22      
∆ln (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃) 0 92.48*** 65.15 117.64 1.17 4.65 4.46       
1 69.49** 93.98 187.22** 1.14 2.49 1.64       
2 74.99** 57.54 134.46 2.33 4.58 4.1       
3 52.19 54.64 113.12 2.27 5.63 4.72       
4 68.19** 50.86 95.83 2.22 5.51 6.26      
Notes: We include a constant term, a trend term, and up to four lagged differences in the ADF regressions for the MW tests and Pesaran (2007) tests. We do not include a trend term in the MW tests and IPS tests 
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TABLE B: Pedroni (1999) Cointegration Tests 
 Oil Exporters High and Middle-Income Oil Importers Full sample oil importers 
 OTB NTB TTB OTB NTB TTB OTB NTB TTB 
Panel-v -3.54 -4.14 -3.00 -5.81 -4.95 -4.34 -6.53 -5.16 -5.19 
Panel-rho 4.13 2.67 3.14 7.15 5.93 5.31 7.71 6.13 6.41 
Panel-t -0.08 -2.55 -0.27 3.82 2.34 1.84 2.80 0.76 1.72 
Panel-adf 4.20 -0.63 -0.09 7.64 4.00 3.43 9.79 4.37 4.68 
Group-rho 5.97 4.97 5.14 9.07 8.57 7.86 9.99 9.65 9.60 
Group-t 0.14 -1.41 0.79 3.78 3.52 2.96 2.82 2.49 3.11 
Group-adf 3.14 1.57 1.64 8.62 5.51 4.76 11.11 6.69 6.12 
Notes: H0: No cointegration. We include a constant and trend term. The number of lags is determined using the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)  
TABLE C: Westerlund (2007) CSD robust Cointegration Tests 
 Oil Exporters High and Middle-Income Oil Importers Full sample oil importers 
 OTB NTB TTB OTB NTB TTB OTB NTB TTB 
Statistic Value p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value Test p-value 
Group-t -2.48 0.65 -2.72 0.36 -3.203 0.14 -2.90 0.23 -2.65 0.51 -2.25 0.83 -2.79 0.30 -2.76 0.38 -2.31 0.84 
Group-a -6.166 0.91 -7.97 0.76 -8.823 0.67 -6.65 0.98 -5.52 1.00 -5.32 0.99 -7.19 0.97 -6.85 1.00 -6.43 0.99 
Panel-t -11.805 0.38 -14.74 0.10 -13.298 0.35 -15.12 0.41 -16.65 0.18 -14.64 0.55 -20.17 0.34 -22.36 0.13 -18.34 0.62 
Panel-a -7.196 0.62 -8.60 0.39 -8.204 0.65 -6.91 0.82 -7.03 0.69 -7.36 0.70 -7.33 0.83 -7.80 0.73 -7.45 0.76 
Notes: H0: No cointegration. We include a constant and trend term. We use bootstrapped standard errors that are robust to CSD.  
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Appendix B: List of Sample Countries 
Oil Exporters Full Sample Oil Importers High and Middle-Income Oil Importers 
Algeria Australia Guyana Panama Australia Namibia 
Angola Austria Haiti Paraguay Austria Netherlands 
Bahrain Belgium Honduras Peru Belgium New Zealand 
Brunei Belize Hungary Philippines Belize Paraguay 
Chad Botswana India Poland Botswana Peru 
Colombia Brazil Ireland Portugal Brazil Poland 
Congo, Republic of Burkina Faso Israel Romania Chile Portugal 
Ecuador Cape Verde Italy Rwanda Cyprus Romania 
Egypt Central African Rep. Jamaica Senegal Dominica Seychelles 
Equatorial Guinea Chile Japan Seychelles Dominican Republic Spain 
Gabon China Jordan Sierra Leone El Salvador Swaziland 
Indonesia Comoros Kenya Spain Finland Sweden 
Kazakhstan Cyprus Korea Sri Lanka France Switzerland 
Kuwait Djibouti Lebanon Swaziland Germany Thailand 
Mexico Dominica Malawi Sweden Greece Tunisia 
Nigeria Dominican Republic Mali Switzerland Hungary Turkey 
Norway El Salvador Mauritius Tanzania Ireland United States 
Oman Ethiopia Morocco Thailand Israel Uruguay 
Saudi Arabia Finland Mozambique Tunisia Italy  
Sudan France Namibia Turkey Jamaica  
Syrian Arab Republic Germany Nepal Uganda Japan  
Trinidad and Tobago Ghana Netherlands United States Jordan  
United Arab Emirates Greece New Zealand Uruguay Korea  
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. Guinea Niger Vanuatu Lebanon  
Yemen Guinea-Bissau Pakistan Zambia Mauritius  
  
 Zimbabwe   
 
Appendix C: Data Sources 
Variable Source 
Global oil production US Energy Information Administration (EIA), millions of 
barrels per day 
Global real economic activity Lutz Kilian’s website 
Exchange rate IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO), Local currency per 
unit of US $ 
Real GDP/ Real world GDP World Bank’s Word Development Indicators (WDI), 
constant 2005 US $ 
Nominal GDP IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO), current US $ 
Oil exports and oil imports IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO), current US $ 
Merchandise exports and imports World Bank’s Word Development Indicators (WDI), current 
US $ 
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Appendix D: Variable measurements 
Variable Measurement 
Overall goods trade balance (Merchandise exports- Merchandise imports)/nominal 
GDP 
Oil trade balance (Oil exports-oil imports)/nominal GDP 
Nonoil trade balance Overall goods trade balance-oil trade balance 
Real oil price US refiner acquisition cost of imported oil/ US CPI 
Real exchange rate US dollar exchange rate *US CPI)/Country CPI 
 
Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics- Oil Exporters 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Median Max 
∆𝑇𝑇𝐵 757 0.00 0.09 -0.51 0.00 0.64 
∆𝑂𝑇𝐵 660 0.00 0.07 -0.42 0.00 0.54 
∆𝑁𝑇𝐵 660 0.00 0.07 -0.67 0.00 0.48 
𝜉𝑜𝑠 800 -0.03 0.25 -0.87 -0.04 0.28 
𝜉𝑜𝑑 800 -0.03 0.32 -0.64 0.00 0.81 
𝜉𝑎𝑔𝑑  800 0.00 0.31 -0.54 -0.07 0.92 
∆ln (𝑅𝐸𝑅 728 0.00 0.17 -0.58 -0.01 1.89 
∆ln (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃) 734 0.04 0.07 -0.28 0.04 0.92 
Descriptive statistics- High and Middle-Income Oil Importers 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Median Max 
∆𝑇𝑇𝐵 1333 0.00 0.04 -0.32 0.00 0.29 
∆𝑂𝑇𝐵 1218 0.00 0.02 -0.12 0.00 0.25 
∆𝑁𝑇𝐵 1218 0.00 0.04 -0.22 0.00 0.26 
𝜉𝑜𝑠 1376 -0.03 0.25 -0.87 -0.04 0.28 
𝜉𝑜𝑑 1376 -0.03 0.32 -0.64 0.00 0.81 
𝜉𝑎𝑔𝑑  1376 0.00 0.31 -0.54 -0.07 0.92 
∆ln (𝑅𝐸𝑅 1168 0.00 0.11 -0.66 0.00 0.80 
∆ln (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃) 1294 0.03 0.04 -0.55 0.03 0.32 
Descriptive statistics-Full Sample Oil Importers 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Median Max 
∆𝑇𝑇𝐵 2356 0.00 0.04 -0.32 0.00 0.36 
∆𝑂𝑇𝐵 2205 0.00 0.02 -0.12 0.00 0.25 
∆𝑁𝑇𝐵 2205 0.00 0.04 -0.27 0.00 0.27 
𝜉𝑜𝑠 2432 -0.03 0.25 -0.87 -0.04 0.28 
𝜉𝑜𝑑 2432 -0.03 0.32 -0.64 0.00 0.81 
𝜉𝑎𝑔𝑑  2432 0.00 0.31 -0.54 -0.07 0.92 
∆ln (𝑅𝐸𝑅 2177 0.02 0.33 -0.67 0.00 12.54 
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Appendix F: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients between all variables 
Pairwise correlation coefficients- Oil Exporters 
 
∆𝑇𝑇𝐵 ∆𝑂𝑇𝐵 ∆𝑁𝑇𝐵 ∆𝐿𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑅 ∆𝐿𝑁𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝜉𝑜𝑠 𝜉𝑎𝑔𝑑 𝜉𝑎𝑑 
         
∆𝑇𝑇𝐵 1.000 
       
∆𝑂𝑇𝐵 0.631 1.000 
      
∆𝑁𝑇𝐵 0.711 -0.097 1.000 
     
∆ln (𝑅𝐸𝑅 0.118 0.162 0.055 1.000 
    
∆ln (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃) 0.157 0.254 -0.009 -0.062 1.000 
   
𝜉𝑜𝑠 -0.005 0.071 -0.061 -0.064 0.073 1.000 
  
𝜉𝑎𝑔𝑑 -0.125 -0.172 -0.014 -0.067 0.018 0.134 1.000 
 
𝜉𝑜𝑑 0.193 0.211 0.040 0.091 -0.022 -0.006 0.021 1.000 
Pairwise correlation coefficients- High and Middle-Income Oil Importers 
 ∆𝑇𝑇𝐵 ∆𝑂𝑇𝐵 ∆𝑁𝑇𝐵 ∆𝐿𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑅 ∆𝐿𝑁𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝜉𝑜𝑠 𝜉𝑎𝑔𝑑 𝜉𝑎𝑑          
∆𝑇𝑇𝐵 1.000 
       
∆𝑂𝑇𝐵 0.268 1.000 
      
∆𝑁𝑇𝐵 0.907 -0.163 1.000 
     
∆ln (𝑅𝐸𝑅 0.134 -0.067 0.133 1.000 
    
∆ln (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃) -0.117 0.037 -0.168 -0.126 1.000 
   
𝜉𝑜𝑠 -0.020 -0.026 -0.015 -0.142 -0.008 1.000 
  
𝜉𝑎𝑔𝑑 0.094 0.116 0.055 -0.102 -0.050 0.134 1.000 
 
𝜉𝑜𝑑 0.022 -0.089 0.059 0.057 -0.035 -0.006 0.021 1.000 
Pairwise correlation coefficients- Full Sample Oil Importers 
 ∆𝑇𝑇𝐵 ∆𝑂𝑇𝐵 ∆𝑁𝑇𝐵 ∆𝐿𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑅 ∆𝐿𝑁𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝜉𝑜𝑠 𝜉𝑎𝑔𝑑 𝜉𝑎𝑑          
∆𝑇𝑇𝐵 1.000 
       
∆𝑂𝑇𝐵 0.285 1.000 
      
∆𝑁𝑇𝐵 0.933 -0.078 1.000 
     
∆ln (𝑅𝐸𝑅 -0.046 -0.077 -0.033 1.000 
    
∆ln (𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃) -0.060 0.001 -0.068 -0.146 1.000 
   
𝜉𝑜𝑠 -0.016 -0.020 -0.014 -0.045 0.025 1.000 
  
𝜉𝑎𝑔𝑑 0.090 0.139 0.049 -0.038 -0.011 0.134 1.000 
 
𝜉𝑜𝑑 0.020 -0.098 0.057 -0.020 -0.001 -0.006 0.021 1.000 
 
